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Abstract 
Historically, battering has been a culturally and legally acceptable form of social con-
trol within the United States. This article provides an examination of how this leg-
acy of social acceptance has influenced the development of laws and social policies 
related to battering. We provide a critique of our current approach to battering and 
our historical reliance on private or social helping agencies intended to hide and 
protect victims. We call for a transformation of our current policies that provides 
for the removal of the batterer—not the victim and her children—from the family 
home through a process of bail denial and preventative detention. 
Keywords: criminal justice policy, domestic violence, intimate partner violence   
Discussion and indeed criticism of  social and legal policy is not new in the so-
cial sciences. There is an abundance of  articles advocating a variety of  perspec-
tives on enforcement practices, use of  new technologies, political and philosophi-
cal arguments, theoretical viewpoints, and counseling or social agency strategies. 
Few of  these articles, however, utilize a historical understanding of  battering as 
an acceptable social practice as the foundation for analyzing current policy and its 
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progression. This article  seeks to fill that gap in the literature and attempts to de-
velop an alternative policy approach, which acknowledges the impact of  this his-
tory of  passive and reactive activities. The goal is to understand how we progressed 
into this state of  inadequate and passive response, while offering potential changes 
that could move us toward social policy that involves the more assertive, direct, tar-
geted, and proactive use of  scarce resources for addressing battering. 
The current battering policies emerged from a system that has historically con-
doned violence against women and protected the rights of  the batterer (Pleck, 
1987). For that purpose, this article acknowledges that battering is perpetrated by 
men and women, but emphasizes the overwhelming reality that women are com-
monly the victims. The current system places responsibility on battered women to 
take action and assume the associated risks to seek the assistance of  a social help-
ing agency to remove herself  and her children from the situation (Browne, 1987). 
The batterer, on the other hand, remains in the family home. We call for a trans-
formation of  our approach to battering that provides for bail denial and removal 
of  the batterer from the family home. The proposed approach reduces the undue 
burden on the victim, holds the batterer accountable for his actions, and provides 
a more cost effective application of  social agency resources. 
An Overview of the History of Battering:  
Social and Legal Positions
Historically, battering has been shrouded in privacy as a legally acceptable form of  
social control within the family. Since religions or churches originally possessed 
the power to define, demand, and sanction social control, many religious tradi-
tions— including Judeo–Christian tradition—supported the submission of  all fam-
ily members to the control of  the male head-of-household. These traditions also 
prescribed the responsibility of  that male head-of-household for maintaining con-
trol and discipline of  his property (which included ownership of  wives and chil-
dren) by whatever means necessary even through corporal punishment (Belknap, 
1992; Davidson, 1977; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Gordon, 1989; Gosselin, 2005; 
Pleck, 1983, 1987). The belief  that there was a “natural hierarchical relationship” 
between husband and wife became institutionalized in the practices of  both the 
church and the state (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Accordingly, battering became a 
socially and legally acceptable form of  social control. Battering received little at-
tention as a social issue or problem until the late 19th century when the first wave 
of  the women’s rights movement questioned the validity of  such complete control 
by husbands and fathers, corporal punishment as a tool of  that control, and the sig-
nificance of  alcohol in promoting or escalating such violence against women and 
children (Dubois, 1978; Gage, 1981; Harper, 1898; Pleck, 1983, 1987). 
Under Roman Civil Law, men had full property ownership of  their wives, chil-
dren, and slaves. This ownership power included the right to buy, sell, control, and 
punish, as well as the right to determine life or death. Any harm committed against 
a man’s wife, children, or slaves was a crime against him. During this era, women 
and children  had no legal or human rights; consequently, they had no access to 
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courts to appeal excessive punishment (Gosselin, 2005; Masters, 1964). Early Chris-
tianity has been historically rooted in laws that established and maintained patriar-
chy, including the ownership of  women and children, and the male right to control 
his property through corporal punishment or even death (Gosselin, 2005). Many 
scholars have noted the specificity of  the Christian Bible concerning the subordi-
nation of  women to men and the need for men to use corporal punishment to de-
mand the submission of  wives and children to their wishes (Davidson, 1977; Da-
vis, 1971; Gosselin, 2005; Masters, 1964). 
Medieval men were firmly advised by the church to maintain absolute and com-
plete control of  their wives and children. A failure to do so would result in societal 
chaos for which they would be damned and punished themselves (Dutton, 1998; 
Masters, 1964; Pushkareva, 1997). During Medieval times, the only provisions in 
the law addressing battering were warnings to men not to beat wives, children, and 
slaves to the point of  causing blindness or deafness because this would create a per-
manent devaluation of  their property (Masters, 1964). Women and children, just 
like slaves, had no outlet for confronting or contesting their abuse during this era. 
Although available to men in some areas of  the world, divorce for women has been 
virtually unheard of  in history. Men were generally required either to keep an un-
wanted wife as a servant and remarry someone else or kill her before remarrying 
(King, 2007; Lefkowitz & Fant, 1992; Pagelow, 1984; Pushkareva, 1997). Divorce 
for women did not become an issue, even if  the reason was severe cruelty, until the 
late 19th century, when the first wave of  the women’s movement broached the is-
sue with little success (Pleck, 1983). The French Civil Code of  the late 1700s de-
clared women to be legal minors for their entire lives and placed them under the 
complete control of  their male guardian (i.e., father or husband). This law spec-
ified that men were responsible for administering corporal punishment of  their 
wives. A wide array of  punishments were available to husbands, including the use 
of  punching, kicking the body, and permanent disfigurement, such as breaking his 
wife’s nose so there would be observable injuries to increase her shame (Dobash 
& Dobash, 1978; Gosselin, 2005). 
In 1768, Sir William Blackstone codified the British Common Law. In this work, 
Blackstone specified that man and woman become one entity by marriage and the 
woman’s legal existence as a person ceases. Though Blackstone did not attempt to 
criminalize battering, he created the first codified effort to regulate the severity of  
battering allowed. Blackstone created the common law terminology of  the “rule 
of  thumb,” stating that a husband had the legal right and responsibility to control 
and punish his wife; however, this should be done with a stick no thicker than his 
thumb (Dutton, 1998; Gosselin, 2005; Pagelow, 1984; Ulrich, 1991). Prior to 1768, 
the common laws in effect during the medieval period remained in force in most 
of  the Western world, including the American Colonies. There were a few isolated 
efforts in the American Colonies to outlaw or regulate the battering of  wives and 
children. For example, during the late 1600s, battering was outlawed by civil law 
in Massachusetts which allowed a severely battered woman to leave her husband 
(legal separation, not divorce) and expect him to pay maintenance to her for the 
children. This law did not require any legal action be taken against the batterer 
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and was only available to women who could legally prove that the battering went 
far beyond the level necessary for control and punishment. As women of  the time 
were property, with no money or access to the courts to file such an action, this 
law did little to influence the use of  battering as a legally sanctioned form of  social 
control over women (Gosselin, 2005; Pagelow, 1984; Pleck, 1983).
Though there was some early opposition to battering by Colonial American 
ministers, it was not sufficient to thwart the establishment of  the British Common 
Law. Laws concerning battering in the United States developed from the founda-
tion of  battering being a legal and acceptable form of  social control. In some in-
stances, battering was considered a required form of  social control to maintain 
male control over all of  his property and thus maintain male privilege and power. 
After the American Revolutionary War, Americans sought to move away from 
the rather stringent requirements of  the British Common Law and created crim-
inal codes that better suited and represented this new democracy (Pleck, 1983). 
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some legal actions were taken to 
address the most extreme forms of  battering. As battering was socially and legally 
acceptable, most of  the new laws were simply intended to regulate the level of  vi-
olence used and the severity of  injury allowed. Examples of  such laws range from 
the common law “rule of  thumb” to the more modern “stitch rules” that advise 
the abuser of  the amount of  acceptable violence in such altercations, and “cur-
tain rules” reinforce assertions about the private nature of  battering (Tong, 1984). 
Most scholars note that during the 18th and 19th centuries in America, even in ju-
risdictions in which restrictions on severity or injuries existed, laws were rarely en-
forced. Battering was simply not considered a major issue to be addressed by the 
courts (Belknap, 1992; Davidson, 1977; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Pagelow, 1984; 
Pleck, 1989). 
By the late 1800s, battering was one of  the central issues of  the first wave of  the 
Women’s Rights Movement in the United States (Pleck, 1983). This coincided with 
the Temperance Movement’s concern with battering as well. As Pleck (1983) noted, 
battering was utilized politically in two ways during this era. First, by conservatives 
like Lucy Stone in the Women’s movement, who joined forces with members of  the 
Temperance movement to identify the linkages between alcohol abuse, battering, 
and child abuse and develop a strategy by which the wives of  drunkards could di-
vorce their abusive husbands. The second approach was taken by more liberal fem-
inists such as Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who felt that men 
would never address battering or other violence against women and children be-
cause it supported their maintenance of  power and privilege. These feminists took 
direct aim at the need for women to have suffrage, representation in government, 
property rights, and divorce rights to be able to force legal change and enforcement. 
By the late 1800s and early 1900s, battering of  wives and children began to be 
considered unacceptable; nevertheless, few legal sanctions existed to stop battering. 
Some states created laws that noted women’s right to equal protection under the 
law, but most states refused to enforce such laws or recognize their application to 
battering (Belknap, 1992; Davidson, 1977; Gordon, 1989; Pleck, 1983). By the end 
of  World  War I, battering was firmly hidden behind closed doors and protected 
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by references to privacy and the sanctity of  the family. Most scholars indicate that 
this state of  affairs continued unabated for the next 50 years (Belknap, 1992; David-
son, 1977; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Gordon, 1989; Gosselin, 2005; Pleck, 1983). 
Accordingly, battering came to be draped in the shawl of  family privacy that con-
tinues to plague its termination today (Miller & Peterson, 2007). Laws concerning 
battering have developed from a foundation of  acceptability and regulation rather 
than one of  social disapproval and criminalization. This drastically influenced the 
development of  both modern laws that criminalize battering and social resources 
for battered women in need of  protection. During the second wave of  the Women’s 
Rights Movement in the United States (1960s and 1970s), activists pushed for the 
reduction in barriers that prevented women from exercising their human and civil 
rights in American society. One of  those barriers involved the government-sanc-
tioned power of  men to exercise coercive control of  all family members. As a result 
of  this effort, laws emerged that moderately criminalized battering. For example, 
police began to respond to domestic disputes and attempted to diffuse these situa-
tions. Some jurisdictions made battering an ordinance violation or misdemeanor 
crime so that fines could be levied against abusers. This slow roundabout progres-
sion toward criminalization reflects historical views of  battering as acceptable, nec-
essary, and benign, and our unwillingness to interfere with male control and pri-
vacy of  the home. This may well explain why most of  our social efforts to address 
battering, assist victims, and prevent the injuries and deaths associated with bat-
tering have primarily been done in the form of  women’s social helping agencies 
rather than state law and law enforcement agencies. 
Difficulties With the Current Approach
The progression toward criminalization of  battering required the slow but steady 
discrediting of  long-held social and cultural beliefs, as well as the legal and religious 
foundations on which such beliefs flourished. This focus resulted in laws that reg-
ulated battering with restrictions on the level of  violence and severity of  injuries. 
In the interim, battering was primarily seen as an extreme but acceptable form of  
social control that continued to be the right of  male heads-of-household who we 
trusted to act without direct oversight. At this point, battering became a family or 
“private” matter with few social implications. 
During this interim period, only the most extreme forms and instances of  batter-
ing were brought to public attention and this was generally done by feminists (con-
sidered radicals), which may well have reduced the impact of  the information on the 
general public and policy makers (men) as well (Houston, 2014). Sensing little inter-
est by men, religious leaders, or government officials for addressing the aftermath of  
men who chose not to exercise restraint in their use of  power in the family, feminists 
felt obligated to join other interested social groups in an effort to provide some help 
to victims and increase the availability of  information and education to the general 
public (Martin, 1981; Tong, 1984). Feminists, as part of  their commitment to blend 
knowledge, research, politics, and praxis, began the development of  social charita-
ble  organizations designed to assist battered women in the most egregious cases, at 
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a time when women were property or might as well have been property because they 
had no access to the law or its protection. These were the seeds that grew into the 
network of  social helping agencies that are still attempting to assist battered women 
today. These social charitable organizations have continued to grow over time along 
with the movement to criminalize battering. This progression notwithstanding, bat-
tering remained a social ill best left in the realm of women’s assistance agencies rather 
than to law enforcement, correctional, and treatment authorities. 
By the 1950s and 1960s, the second wave of  the Women’s Movement had long 
since discovered the failure of  this passive, social help focused approach. Feminists, 
and other groups, began again to force battering onto the public agenda. They man-
aged to elevate battering to a social issue with broad ranging constitutional, legal, 
and health/medical implications. As a result of  better record keeping, organiza-
tional activism, and the removal of  barriers for women attempting to exercise their 
human and civil rights, information about the numbers of  women reporting bat-
tering, women and children utilizing the assistance of  social helping agencies, and 
the number of  domestic homicides involving battering became publicly available. 
For the first time in our history, battering became a publicly identifiable and tan-
gible problem requiring a social and legal response (Houston, 2014; Pleck, 1987). 
Our response to battering during the 1970s and early 1980s centered upon 
that old victim-blaming question of  “why doesn’t she leave?” rather than the far 
more important questions of  “why does he batter?” and “how can we prevent it?” 
(Browne, 1987). The basic policy response has been to recommend that the bat-
tered woman take action and assume the associated risks to obtain the assistance 
of  a social helping agency to remove herself  and her children from the situation. 
Then the criminal justice system may or may not step in and act on the victim’s 
behalf  to stop the violence. This has forced social helping agencies to focus their 
scarce resources on providing temporary safety and protection of  victims as well 
as the financial, counseling, educational, and job assistance that they were origi-
nally intended to provide. Browne and Williams (1989) contend that the number 
of  domestic homicides involving battering decline when social helping agencies are 
completely successful at providing safety, protection, food, shelter, legal advocacy, 
counseling, educational opportunities, job assistance, and a multitude of  other es-
sential services to battering victims and their children. Unfortunately, social help-
ing agencies are not funded, equipped, or trained to provide all of  these services; 
they were created to assist victims and their children in reducing the level of  disrup-
tion in their lives with counseling, financial planning, and job assistance program-
ming. These agencies were not created to provide tactical safety to crime victims 
nor do they have the resources to adequately pursue such a goal, much less achieve 
it (Martin, 1981). Requiring social helping agencies to function in this manner has 
spread their resources dangerously thin; their inability to serve a sufficient client 
base results in larger numbers of  people that may remain at risk for victimization. 
This approach seems to have grown naturally out of  the slow process of  change 
that has taken place on this issue in the United States. It represents our failure to 
reevaluate  policy direction as we have learned more about battering and its effects. 
A good example of  this problem is that we now know that about 50% of  women 
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who are killed each year by their batterer are killed while trying to leave or shortly 
thereafter (Browne, 1987; Mahoney, 1991). Social helping agencies have tried to re-
spond to this problem, but domestic violence policy has not evolved to address this 
critical stage. Battered victims are still required to take the risk of  action to leave 
even though we know that is when they are most likely to be killed. Efforts today, 
just as in the past, remain focused on temporary safety assistance rather than di-
rectly addressing battering as illegal assaultive behavior against which all people in 
the United States are guaranteed protection under the law. It speaks to the rather 
slow process in the United States of  accepting women not only as citizens with 
rights but also as equal citizens with full access to the opportunities necessary to 
exercise those rights. Sometimes, as in the past, this progression is impeded when 
it interferes or competes with the inherent hegemonic masculinity of  the legal sys-
tem (Belknap, 2015; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Houston, 2014; Pleck, 1987). 
Today, battering is criminalized in the United States. Battering or domestic as-
sault statutes exist in every state and battering is coded as either a misdemeanor 
simple assault or a felony assault (Zamora, 2005). Many areas have laws requiring 
that police officers actively arrest someone on a domestic violence call, although 
the efficacy of  such policies has not been confirmed (Goodman & Epstein, 2008; 
Iyengar, 2009). Most states make provisions for fast track protection orders for bat-
tered women, despite the problems associated with the enforcement of  these or-
ders (Zamora, 2005). 
Researchers consistently agree that statistics addressing battering are limited, 
given that most victims do not report their victimizations to police or research-
ers. Recent figures approximate that as many as five million women are battered 
each year in the United States (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 
2003; Tjaden & Theonnes, 2000). Moreover, child abuse is markedly more preva-
lent in homes in which battering occurs; according to the National Domestic Vio-
lence Coalition (2015), children are abused in battering homes at a higher rate than 
those in non-violent homes. The National Center for Injury Prevention and Con-
trol (2003) and the American Medical Association (1991) report that hundreds of  
thousands of  doctor, hospital, and emergency facility visits each year are related 
to battering. In addition, approximately 2,000 women are killed by their intimate 
partners each year (Rand & Rennison, 2004). 
Our progress in this area has been slow and less than adequate. Part of  the prob-
lem is that we continue to lay the burden and most of  the punishment for batter-
ing on victims and their children, rather than squarely and clearly on the batterer. 
For example, we still require the victim to seek outside assistance for safety, which 
increases her risk of  being killed and increases the disruption of  her life and her 
children’s lives. The victim’s relocation may also increase risk to the lives of  oth-
ers such as shelter workers, crisis center workers, social workers, friends, and fam-
ily who may try to help or provide shelter. Clergy, counselors, and even neighbors 
that try to be good civic members by calling the police and providing information 
are putting themselves at risk of  retaliation from the accused batterer. There is an 
apparent satisfaction with this roundabout, passive, and reactive approach to bat-
tering that forces the victim and her children to ultimately assume the risk and 
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disruption in their lives to survive and obtain protection under the law. With the 
current approach, we avoid proactively addressing battering where the problem re-
ally lies, which is in the batterer and his behavior.  
Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice Response: An 
Alternative Approach 
To address these deficiencies, judges should be permitted to deny bail to defen-
dants arrested of  domestic battery. During the period of  detention, the batterer 
would be transported to a treatment facility and required to undergo an evalua-
tion to assess his violent behavior. The batterer would remain in that facility un-
til deemed safe to return to society. A batterer treatment-based policy, such as that 
proposed here, has the potential to significantly reduce the amount of  male-per-
petrated domestic battery (see for example, Sonkin, Martin, & Walker, 1985). The 
placement of  the abuser in a long-term care facility presents a number of  poten-
tial advantages over our current system of  handling domestic battery. First, the po-
tential for victimization is eliminated. One of  the most dangerous events for vic-
tims of  domestic battery is the termination of  their relationship with the batterer. 
More than 5% of  domestic battery victims are killed as a result of  a “separation 
attack” (Browne, 1987; Mahoney, 1991). The hiatus provided by denying the bat-
terer bail gives the victim an opportunity to take steps toward a permanent sepa-
ration from the batterer and ensures her safety—and that of  her children—during 
this very critical separation stage. 
In addition to ensuring the victim’s safety and that of  the public, the detention 
period also provides an important opportunity for intervention. During this time 
period, the batterer will be provided with counseling sessions and a treatment pro-
gram that centers upon him understanding the underlying motivations for his com-
mission of  violence against family members. The dual goals of  the program are 
(a) to help him to understand that his behavior will no longer be tolerated and (b) 
to empower him to change his behavior. 
Another important advantage of  the proposed approach is that the level of  fam-
ily disruption is minimized. Rather than being required to seek protection and shel-
ter from an ill-equipped shelter, the victim and her children would remain in the 
home without changing employers or schools. It is also less costly to relocate the 
batterer rather than all of  the other family members. Moreover, it eliminates the 
possibility that the victim’s attempt to seek assistance will result in violence esca-
lation. With the abuser removed from the household, both the victim and her chil-
dren can obtain assistance and counseling from social resource agencies. During 
this important transitional period, the victim and her children can begin a coun-
seling program designed to offset some of  the debilitating effects of  intimate part-
ner violence. 
Dobash, Dobash, and Cavanagh (1984) warn that the ability of  social service 
and medical agencies to effectively provide safe and protective services is hindered 
by organizational limitations. Ogle and Jacobs (2003) further postulate that our 
current approach to battering, which forces victims to take responsibility for the 
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cessation of  violence, actually reinforces the efforts of  the batterer and may esca-
late the level of   violence, particularly if  the assistance provided by social resource 
agencies is failure prone. Our proposal would reallocate social service funding so 
that we could focus our attention on improving the victim’s access to “material re-
sources” and concomitantly reduce her vulnerability to the batterer (Coker, 1990). 
Considered another way, as social service agencies would no longer be responsible 
for providing the victim and her children with housing and protection, resources 
could be centered on tasks that are congruent with the intended mission and ca-
pabilities of  the social services: employment assistance, adjustment, financial sta-
bilization, treatment, and counseling. 
Ideally, the proposed system of  bail denial would be part of  a larger coordi-
nated community response to domestic battery, such as that implemented in Du-
luth, Minnesota, which would assign an advocate to the battered woman’s case at 
the police report stage (Pence, 1999). Although the model’s batterer intervention 
program has been criticized, the victim advocacy component is an obvious step in 
the right direction (Dutton & Corvo, 2007; Gondolf, 2007). The advocate would 
work with the victim to assess her needs and those of  her children. Upon assess-
ment, the advocate would provide the victim with both direct access to material 
resources such as food or clothing, as well as indirect access to other services such 
as child care, job training, and transportation (Coker, 1990).  
Legal Justification for Denying Bail to Batterers 
Although there is some variation in the manner in which the U.S. courts interpret 
the Eighth Amendment protections against excessive bail, some legal scholars be-
lieve it implies a right to bail (Verilli, 1982). In fact, most states provide a right to 
bail in all non-capital cases (Harvard Law Review, 1966). Historically, bail has been 
denied in capital cases under the rationale that a defendant would prefer the loss 
of  any amount of  money to showing up at his or her own hanging (Verilli, 1982). 
Because battering is not classified as a capital offense, we must examine alterna-
tive legal strategies for denying bail to batterers.  
The Defendant’s Perceived Dangerousness 
At the federal level, bail has been categorically denied in crimes of  violence (Bail 
Reform Act, 1984). The underlying rationale governing preventative detention in 
these kinds of  cases is the perceived or presumed dangerousness of  the defendant 
and the associated danger that would be posed to other persons or the community 
at large if  the defendant were released prior to trial (Verilli, 1982). Similarly, under 
federal law, bail denial may be used to prevent the defendant from interfering with 
the witnesses or tampering with the evidence, two potential problems that emerge 
in domestic battery cases (U.S. v. Salerno, 1987). 
Bail decisions at the state level are different than those made at the federal level. 
In most states, the defendant’s right to bail is expressly provided in the state con-
stitution. Thus, denial of  bail—or preventative detention of  batterers—is permissi-
ble only by constitutional amendment (Harvard Law Review, 1966; Ex parte Ball, 
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1920). Some states have adopted preventative detention proposals by amending 
their state constitutions. For example, in Nebraska, Texas, and Michigan, the right 
to bail may be denied for defendants who have committed specific types of  crime. 
In these states, magistrates do not make assessments about individual defendants’ 
propensities for dangerousness, instead certain defendants are denied their right to 
bail based upon the type of  crime they have committed (Verilli, 1982). In Wiscon-
sin, on the other hand, not only can defendants be categorically denied bail based 
upon the crime they have allegedly committed but also assessments about defen-
dants’ dangerousness are left to the discretion of  the magistrate. 
Arguably few crimes are more violent than domestic battery. Battering is rarely 
an isolated event, and many batterers subject their victims to repeated victimiza-
tions, even after there has been an intervention by the police (Bybee & Sullivan, 
2005; Cole, Logan, & Shannon, 2008; Fleury-Steiner, Bybee, Sullivan, Belknap, 
& Melton, 2006; Gover, Welton-Mitchell, Belknap, & DePrince, 2013). In order 
for bail denial to be an option in cases involving domestic battering, states would 
have to reclassify battering as a crime of  violence by amending their current crim-
inal statutes. Many states have already defined domestic battering as a separate 
and distinct type of  battering. Within this classification scheme, the most severe 
forms of  battering are punishable as a felony. In Arkansas, for example, first and 
second degree wife battering and aggravated assault on a wife are classified in the 
state statutes as felonies, whereas all other degrees are misdemeanors (Shad, 1990). 
Similarly, Public Act 91-445 was passed to amend the Illinois Criminal Codes to 
create a new offense category of  aggravated domestic battery. Any person who, 
in the commission of  a domestic battery, “intentionally or knowingly causes great 
bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggravated domes-
tic battery” and will be charged with a Class 2 felony. The statutory amendments 
further stipulate that any defendant who has a previous conviction of  aggravated 
domestic battery “may remain in custody if  a continuance is filed in a bail denial 
hearing” (Fike, 1999: 521). A state-level statutory reclassification—similar to those 
outlined here—would provide a legal avenue for bail denial. State legislators would 
have to identify the crime of  battering as a crime of  violence. 
Preventative Detention via High Bail 
The statutory provisions for legally denying bail to certain defendants notwith-
standing, sometimes judges accomplish preventative detention by setting an ex-
orbitant amount for bail. In Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court justices stipulated 
that bail could not be set “higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill 
(the) purpose” of  assuring the defendant’s presence at trial. Furthermore, although 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive bail,” courts have been fairly consis-
tent in confirming that bail in an amount greater than the defendant can provide is 
not necessarily excessive (Harmsworth, 1996; Harvard Law Review, 1966; Metz-
meier, 1996). In some jurisdictions, judges establish going rates for bail amounts 
in particular kinds of  offenses. In Omaha, Nebraska, for example, judges set a 
$50,000 arrest bond in all domestic violence cases. As a result, many defendants 
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are detained prior to trial. Though  preventative detention for pecuniary reasons 
is not consistent with most constitutional interpretations of  bail, it is a practice 
that has emerged in many different jurisdictions and presents a second method by 
which bail denial could be implemented in cases of  domestic battering (Harms-
worth, 1996; Metzmeier, 1996).  
Right to Bail Exemptions in Domestic Violence Cases 
Another legal strategy to accomplish bail denial requires a statutory specification 
exempting certain defendants’ rights to bail. Some jurisdictions have adopted these 
kinds of  provisions for denying bail in certain domestic violence cases (Dutson, 
1994). For example, the Utah Legislature has adopted the “Cohabitant Abuse Pro-
cedures Act,” which specifies, 
. . . because of  the unique and highly emotional nature of  domestic vio-
lence crimes, the high recidivism rate of  violent offenders, and the demon-
strated increased risk of  continued acts of  violence subsequent to the re-
lease of  an offender . . . bail may be denied if  there is substantial evidence 
to support the charge . . . 
Similarly, Nevada law has adopted a provision that mandates a “cooling off ” 
period before which a defendant may be admitted to bail. More specifically, NRS 
33.018 requires that any defendant 
arrested for a battery upon his spouse, former spouse, a person to whom 
he is related by blood, a person with whom he is or was actually residing, 
or with whom he has a child in common, his minor child or a minor child 
of  that person must not be admitted to bail sooner than twelve hours af-
ter his arrest. 
Though the aforementioned applications of  bail denial in specific situations of  
domestic battery cases provide a much more direct application to the proposal, it 
is important to note that there is one Australian example of  a jurisdiction which 
has completely eliminated the right to bail for some persons charged with domes-
tic violence offenses. In New South Wales, the presumption in favor of  bail has 
been removed in domestic violence cases “involving violence or intimidation” in 
which “the accused has a history of  violence” (Schurr, 1994). The parliament ad-
opted these changes as part of  a larger package of  domestic violence legislation. 
This example is consistent with the growing global recognition of  violence against 
women. Thus, whether offered for a specific subset of  cases or applied consistently 
across all types of  domestic battering, the legal convention of  bail exemption is yet 
another strategy to accomplish bail denial. 
To summarize, there are a number of  legal strategies that could provide for bail 
denial in cases involving domestic battering. The very cyclical nature of  domestic 
battering warrants consideration of  the defendant’s propensity to subject his vic-
tim to additional attacks. As such, it is not surprising that judges in some juris-
dictions consider this perceived dangerousness in setting bail amounts in domes-
tic battering cases or that legislators have been compelled to adopt reforms that 
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provide exceptions to the  constitutional right to bail in certain cases involving do-
mestic abuse. If  state legislators promulgated reforms that reclassified the crime 
of  domestic battering as a crime of  violence, the convention of  bail denial could 
be made available in a wider number of  jurisdictions. 
Conclusion
Few other areas in criminal justice policy have undergone more reform than that 
which addresses intimate partner violence. Battering persisted unabated through-
out the history of  the United States; criminal justice actors were reluctant to inter-
vene in matters involving family violence. In the past two decades, however, great 
strides have been made to hold batterers accountable for their behavior. State leg-
islators have adopted some fairly aggressive policies related to the crime of  bat-
tering; none of  these policies, however, are sufficiently sympathetic to the victim 
and her children’s needs. Although our laws no longer support battering, our cur-
rent policies place an undue burden on the victim and her children. Under the cur-
rent approach, batterers are permitted to stay in the family home, whereas victims 
and their children are forced to relocate to a shelter. We must abandon our cur-
rent practices and provide victims a safe haven in their homes. Bail denial—even 
temporarily—can give the victim the necessary time to plan for her independence 
from the batterer. 
This proposal is not without potential criticisms. Implementation of  our pro-
posed strategy alone would not correct all of  the existing problems with battering 
policies. For example, contemporary battering policies do not provide much con-
sideration for the victim’s wishes or her individual situation. Instead, a one-size-
fits-all remedy— namely, presumptive or mandatory arrest, often followed by an ag-
gressive no-drop prosecution policy—is applied in each case, regardless of  whether 
that strategy will benefit the victim or produce more harm for her and her children. 
The belief  is that the best approach to battering is one that centers upon the victim 
and her needs; one that is shaped by contextual influences, including her decision 
to maintain or end her relationship with the batterer. 
It is critical that policy recognizes the wide variation in battered women’s expe-
riences. Battering policies must address this variation and the many ways in which 
the intersectionality of  sex, class, race, ethnicity, and immigration status shape 
women’s experiences (Crenshaw, 1991a, 1991b). As Coker (1990) posits, many do-
mestic violence laws ignore the connection between women’s economic subordina-
tion and their vulnerability to battering. Strategies that do not actively address the 
victim’s economic dependence on the batterer serve to further marginalize poor 
battered women. Under this proposed plan, social service agencies would no lon-
ger be required to provide food, shelter, and protection to victims of  domestic vi-
olence and their children. Thus, there would be funding available to provide the 
victim with financial assistance, counseling, and educational and job assistance. 
It is also important to note that many existing policies were adopted without 
consideration of  the collective experiences of  battered women of  color (Crenshaw, 
1991b). Too often, policies that are adopted to protect battered women protect 
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some—but not  all—women. The policies that we adopt to protect victims should 
not operate in such a manner as to harm less-privileged groups of  women. Many 
reforms in this area have the potential to be applied in a racially discriminatory or 
ethnically biased fashion. Advocates of  battered victims must work to ensure that 
bail denial, like so many of  the reforms of  the past, is not discriminatorily applied 
in communities of  color. 
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